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Reframing Survival: It’s about Systems not a Chain
Abstract
The medical standard of care when confronted with sudden cardiac arrest (SCA) is to follow the “Chain of
Survival” by engaging in early access, early CPR, early defibrillation and early advanced life support (ALS).
Particularly in the occupational setting, each of these actions has been identified as critical to support the
patient while awaiting assistance and transportation from the community Emergency Medical Service
(EMS). However, I present here a broader argument that restricting one’s thinking to a conception that the
“likelihood that a victim will survive cardiac arrest increases if each of the elements is addressed” is
inadequate and misleading. Moreover, continuing to focus primarily on these individual elements is
unlikely to solve to any significant degree the complex problem of our vulnerability to death from SCA.
This paper presents an overview of this argument, offers an alternative conceptualization, and proposes
ideas and actions that follow from its logic. While specifically directed at the problem of survival following
SCA, the argument presented also addresses wider problems associated with major medical
emergencies and other disasters.
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Reframing Survival: It’s about Systems not a Chain1
Larry M. Starr, PhD2
The term "Chain of Survival" was coined in 1987 to … capture the essence of
today's ideal system of emergency cardiac care. The critical elements of this
system: early access, early CPR, early defibrillation and early advanced life
support, were conceptualized as interdependent links in the Chain of Survival.
According to the Chain of Survival model of emergency cardiac care, the
likelihood that a victim will survive cardiac arrest increases if each of the
elements is addressed.
It is the timely occurrence of each of these key variables in the continuum of care
that determines who will live and who will die.
Citizen CPR Foundation
www.citizencpr.org/chain.html
The medical standard of care when confronted with sudden cardiac arrest (SCA)
is to follow the “Chain of Survival” by engaging in early access, early CPR, early
defibrillation and early advanced life support (ALS). Particularly in the occupational
setting, each of these actions has been identified as critical to support the patient while
awaiting assistance and transportation from the community Emergency Medical Service
(EMS). However, I present here a broader argument that restricting one’s thinking to a
conception that the “likelihood that a victim will survive cardiac arrest increases if each
of the elements is addressed” is inadequate and misleading. Moreover, continuing to
focus primarily on these individual elements is unlikely to solve to any significant degree
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the complex problem of our vulnerability to death from SCA. This paper presents an
overview of this argument, offers an alternative conceptualization, and proposes ideas
and actions that follow from its logic. While specifically directed at the problem of
survival following SCA, the argument presented also addresses wider problems
associated with major medical emergencies and other disasters.
Over the past 50 years, from the perspective of organizational and management
science, two paradigm3 shifts have occurred. Part I of this paper describes the first, the
nature of how we think about organizations and their activities. Part II presents the
second, how we inquire into and think about information. Appreciating this dual change
is critical to efforts to cope with and manage the chaos and complexity in our
environment including how we prepare for and respond to our vulnerability to sudden
cardiac arrest. Failing to integrate these shifts into plans, policies and procedures
contributes to structural conflicts, perceptions of helplessness or impotency, and limits,
resists or prevents efforts to change. Part III applies the outcome of these paradigms to
better understand, plan for and manage the problem of our vulnerability to sudden cardiac
arrest.

I. Nature of Organizations
When signals of possible SCA (ranging from chain pain to collapse) occur, it
demands responses by those at the scene who recognize the presence of an emergency.
When the scene is a formal organization, potential responders include bystanders,
members of departments (such as safety, security, healthcare, and human resources) and
3
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others who may be alerted or become engaged to voluntarily or by designated role
provide support or care. Since each organization is an independent enterprise, each has
its own organizational structures, governance, history, culture, and sets of policies and
procedures which inform or control the nature of planning and responses.
When someone telephones “911,” a second organizational entity consisting of
police, fire, and/or other designated EMS responders is summoned. Each new person
who arrives to help the SCA patient brings into the organizational space the structures,
governance, history, culture, and policies and procedures of their own organization. This
intersection contains its own organizational dynamics.
When EMS responders determine that advanced life support (ALS) is required,
they provide support while transporting the patient to a third organization, the community
medical institution. At this facility the patient is delivered into the hands of medical and
allied medical personnel with their own structures, governance, history, culture, policies
and procedures. At this intersection there may be dynamics informed by all three
organizations plus the social forces from the community support system (e.g., relatives
and friends) of which the patient’s family is a part.
Therefore, from an organizational perspective, while SCA may occur at a single
organization, its treatment and management involves forces from multiple organizations,
each of which is likely to have its own structures, governance, history, culture, policies
and procedures.
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Mechanical Metaphor
It is common to use metaphors to think about complex structures such as
organizations. From the time of the Industrial Revolution until World War II, for
example, the prevailing metaphor for organizations was a machine with an internal
structure that performed with regularity and with actions that followed causal laws of
physical order. Just as one could assemble parts to build a locomotive engine, so could
an organization be created. Just as each engine part performed a simple and specific
function, so could the organization effectively operate if each person performed a simple
task. This generalization from the construction and operation of a mechanical device to
the coordination and behavior of people transformed much of society from agricultural to
industrial.
At the core of the mechanistic organizational metaphor is simple premise: the
parts (people) are “mindless,” i.e., they have no purposes of their own. Once selected
(hired and trained if necessary) it is assumed that each employee will function as
designed by the user which was generally to achieve (for owners or leaders) either wealth
or a comparable index of power. The important attributes of this “person-as-tool”
approach are reliability, efficiency, controllability and predictability. As long as the
environment remains stable (or did not interfere), the parts (all mindless) have no choice
other than to work as assigned. Indeed, it would be inconceivable to assume a tractor’s
ignition would “decide” not to transmit power when activated. The mindset of the
mechanistic organizational metaphor is that an employee would never question whether
or not to do the assigned job.
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Biological Metaphor
Following the end of World War II, in Europe and in the United States a second
organization model emerged that used a biological metaphor. The assumptions of this
mode of thinking are that organizations are similar to human beings with organic parts
(people) that are more difficult to replace than those in a tractor engine but are yet
“unminded.” The purpose of the organization, like all living organisms, is to survive
often by growing, adapting, developing, and exploiting the environment. In contrast to a
mechanistic model in which profit is the end state or goal, the biological model suggests
that profit is the means to its survival thus allowing corporate wealth to be appreciated as
a social good and an acceptable argument supporting the American Way of Life. Indeed,
most agreed with the chairman of General Motors Corporation when he proclaimed, in
the 1960’s, that "what's good for GM is good for America."
While a higher biological entity has choices about its means and ends, the parts do
not. They react to stimuli from the outside and from other internal parts similar to a
thermostat. For example, the heart cannot decide on its own not to pump blood, and the
stomach cannot decide not to hold or digest food. There is no independent
consciousness, conflict, or choice among any organ or body part. An important
difference with a machine, however, is the presence of the single brain, operating with
executive function (through a communication network) that can autonomously issue
directives to activate the parts.
Since the existence of a brain makes it plausible for some parts (people) within a
biological organism (organization) to decide to act on their own, an outcome that would
be considered disastrous for the executives of an organization, many biological
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organizations tend to operate with a paternalistic, top-down, “command-and-control”
structural framework. This supports the one-brain-in-charge metaphor in which a
corporation (“corpus”) is directed by the chief executive who is the “head” of the
company. Indeed, this model rarely considers or uses psychological characteristics of the
people who work in organizations as relevant to operational or management activities.

Socio-Cultural Metaphor
Within the past 30 years, a third framework has been conceptualized, the sociocultural metaphor. A socio-cultural view considers the organization to be a voluntary
association of multi-minded purposeful members each of whom has a choice of
individual means and ends (goals). When the parts of a system display choice, neither a
mechanistic or biological model can effectively explain, predict or effectively control
activity except on a temporary basis. As a purposeful entity, an organization has
individually purposeful parts (employees at all levels); the organization itself has multiple
and sometimes conflicting purposes; and everyone is part of larger purposeful whole, the
society in which many organizations and individuals co-exist. This inherent hierarchy –
individual, organization, society – is so interconnected that addressing threats and
challenges within any one level often may not be accomplished by operating within that
same level. Only by aligning the interests of the purposeful parts between each other,
each level, and that of the whole can the system function optimally. Also essential to
this modern socio-cultural metaphor is that attention must be given to personality
differences, personal, political and social needs, the meaning of organization change to
participants, and other components of human nature, growth, or change.
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II. Nature of Thinking about Information
For approximately 400 years, classical science including medical science has been
preoccupied with independent variables. This type of thinking is rooted in analytic
geometry where one basic axiom is that the whole is equal to the sum of its parts. To
understand the behavior of a mathematical whole, analysis addresses through reduction
and summation how each individual part (independent variable) affects the whole.
Analytic thinking is the method of inquiry used in most science – physical, biological
and social - and promotes rigorous, controlled experimentation and evaluation. Indeed to
deviate from analytic methods often suggests weakness, lack of statistical power, and
absence of scientific “evidence-based” validity.
The steps of analytic thinking are these: (1) Take apart that which one seeks to
understand; (2) Try to explain the behavior of the parts taken separately; (3) Reassemble
the parts to provide an understanding of the whole.
Analytic thinking has been commonly used to understand organizational
activities. For example, it is assumed that analysis can be used to improve an
organization’s efficiency or productivity. The approach is to divide/reduce the
components (structures, procedures, products, services, etc.) into small parts and to
optimize each. It is similarly assumed that organizational distress or failure can be
sought by searching for a failure within individual components, and that overall
enhancement will follow when the performance of one or more causal parts are improved
independently until the slack between them is used up. Analytic thinking results in the
belief that one person can be the primary cause of overall organizational success.
Analytic thinking also can result in the attribution that the cause for organizational
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inefficiency or poor productivity lies with a specific department such as safety, sales,
marketing, and/or finance, or, unfortunately, to a specific person. The preferred method
of solving an analytic problem is to “restructure,” i.e., to eliminate, outsource, replace or
combine the (independent) functions or parts.
Analytic thinking is linear in that it assumes that the parts will add up to the
whole. For example, this premise makes it reasonable to assume that if company sales
are inadequate, one could intervene by addressing one or more of the components that
cause sales, as is presented in the following relationship and diagrammed in Figure 1.

Sales = Economy + Performance and Quality + Competition + Price + Interest Rates

Figure 1. Linear Contributors of Organizational Sales
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Chain of Survival Metaphor
The Chain of Survival is described as an ideal system of emergency cardiac care.
Using a metaphoric chain of response links (i.e., early access, early CPR, early
defibrillation and early advanced life support), it proposes that if each element is
appropriate addressed, i.e., optimized, the likelihood that a victim will survive cardiac
arrest increases. The Chain of Survival presented below and diagrammed in Figure 2 is
another example assumed to be an analytic linear sequence.

Survival Rate = Early Access + Early CPR + Early AED + Early ALS

Figure 2. Linear Contributors to SCA Survival

In line with this analytic approach and based on data collected between 1976 and
1991 in Seattle, a predictive model of survival4 calculated the relative contribution of
each independent link. This was written as a linear regression equation,
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Survival Rate

=

67% at collapse – 2.3% per minute to CPR – 1.1% per minute to
defibrillation – 2.1% per minute to ACLS

As noted by the authors (p. 1656),
The regression constant, 67%, represents the probability of survival in the
hypothetical situation in which all treatments are delivered immediately on
collapse to patients with prehospital cardiac arrest … With delays in CPR,
defibrillatory shock, and definitive care, the magnitude of the decline in survival
rate per minute is the sum of the three coefficients (-2.2%, -1.1%, -2.1%), or –
5.5%.
While analytic thinking can help one understand the nature of inanimate objects,
it often fails to capture the complete nature of dynamic, homeostatic, cybernetic5 or
organizational systems where human beings have roles. This is because the underlying
assumption that all the parts (i.e., people, teams, departments) are independent of one
another does not apply to organizations particularly when the activity is socio-cultural.
Thus, the linear regression equation offered by Larsen, Eisenberg, et al is of little
prescriptive help because it only considers characteristics of independent components
rather than the interaction between the parts. To address the complexity of managing
SCA which is often characterized by multi-minded purposeful members from multiple
organizations requires a paradigm shift from analytic to systemic thinking.
When one makes inquiries systemically, a different process is used. A systems
thinking approach considers each sub-system in the context of the larger whole of which
it is a component and studies the roles played by all. Rather than examining or treating
5
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each independent part, a systems thinking approach examines the interdependencies
between parts and considers ways to synthesize or combine parts to enhance the whole.
For example, from a systems perspective, the relationship among sales and other
organizational forces could be portrayed as in Figure 3. As shown, the interrelationships
are non-linear and complex; it is not clear where to make intervention(s) in order to
optimize sales. Organizational sales improvement is complex because sales are assumed
to be both a cause and effect of other activities, many of which interact with other forces.
The challenge in an organizational systems approach is to determine the best combination
of forces necessary to ensure a desired level of sales.

Figure 3. Systemic Contributions of Organizational Sales
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Also complex and non-linear are the risk factors associated with heart diseases in
general and SCA in particular. While many understand that smoking is not the direct
cause of a heart attack, from a systems framework, the relationship between smoking and
the heart is complex (see Figure 4 based on Gharajedaghi, 19996).

Figure 4. Systemic Relationship Between Smoking and the Heart
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Complex organizational interactions are often difficult to understand and manage
particularly if one is using an inappropriate thinking strategy. Flood and Jackson (1991)7
suggest that a systems approach is essential when the conditions noted in Table 1 exist.
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Table 1. When Systems Thinking is Appropriate (Flood and Jackson, 1991)
1. There are a large number of elements (e.g., subsystems, departments, people)
2. There are many interactions among the elements
3. Attributes of the elements are not predetermined (e.g., the characteristics of
people and what they do during an interaction are not completely known in
advance)
4. Interaction among the elements is loosely organized (e.g., specific lines of
authority, roles and responsibilities are not fixed)
5. The parts are probabilistic in their behavior (e.g., actions are based on
probabilities rather than fixed physical laws)
6. The system evolves over time
7. “Sub-systems” are purposeful and generate their own goals (e.g., a person or
group can change their mind or become distracted rather than adhere to set goals)
8. The system is subject to behavioral influences from within or outside (e.g.,
powerful others can alter the nature of what is done or how events unfold)
9. The system is largely open to environment

From a systems perspective, the problem of survival following SCA is influenced
by the complex forces summarized in Figure 5 and presented in detail in Figures 5a, 5b,
5c and 5d. The four links of the Chain of Survival are highlighted in Figure 5 and can be
seen as parts that rather than acting as independent predictors interact with many others in
the overall system. To ensure an effective outcome (i.e., to increase the probability of
survival from SCA) the whole system should be addressed rather than any of the parts.
Figure 5 presents the complete SCA system with four continuous cycles framed in
terms of their function (what must be done), structure (the parts involved), process (how
the functions are carried out) and purpose (why the functions are carried out by the
parts). This allows one to understand how the intentions, plans, behaviors and outcomes
of all components are interrelated within each subsystem and within the entire system of
which each is a component.
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Figure 5. System of Survival From SCA
Purpose (Why)

Process
(How)

Function
(What)

Early ALS

Early Access
Early CPR/AED

SCA
Vulnerability

Design/Plan/Prepare

First Responders

EMS Responders

Community Medical Responders

Structure (Parts)
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Figure 5a. Design/Plan/Prepare
Purpose (Why)
Open System:

2

Ensure overall organizational
system planning and control
of workplace SCA
risks/hazards/threats
Design/Plan/Prepare
(Control Risks):

Acquire/Enable,
Select/Identify and Train:
Process
(How)

•Personnel
•Technology
•Service
•Delivery
•Follow-up

SCA Vulnerability:
Risks (actual), Signals,
Threats to health

Structures and Written Plans:
•Governance
•All regulations, policies and
procedures
•Personnel & Agencies
•CPR/AED guidelines
•First Aid guidelines
•Technology/Equipment/
Communication
•Service, support and
•Documentation
•Follow-up
Structure (Parts)
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•Risk (identification/analysis)
•Organizational stakeholders
•Medical/Legal/Ethical/Social
policies and obligations
•Education (knowledge/skill)
•Technology (hardware and
software)
•Communication

Function
(What)

Figure 5b. Workplace First Responders
Purpose (Why)
Open System:
Ensure initial first responder
control of workplace and patient
SCA threats/risks/hazards
integrates with system

Process
(How)

Direct Responding/Feedback:
•Early access (Call 911)
•Assess/Protect
•Early CPR/FA
•Early AED
•Use equipment/technology
•Personnel management

3
1

Recognize and respond to SCA
signals:
•Follow plans
•Control risks/hazards/threats

First Responders Aware and Ready:
First aid/CPR/AED available
•First aid responders
•Occupational Health/Medicine
•Safety/Security
Administrative Governance/Legal
Equipment/Technology available
Communication available
Service/Follow-up available

Structure (Parts)
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Function
(What)

Figure 5c. EMS
Purpose (Why)
Open System:

4

Ensure EMS response
and control of EMS and patient
emergency threats/risks/hazards
integrates with system

Process
(How)

Direct Response/Feedback:
•Assess/Protect
•CPR/Defibrillation
•ALS
Use equipment/technology
Personnel Management
Transportation to medical center
with ongoing patient support

2

Recognize and respond to
request for help by alerting and
sending EMS to scene:
Follow EMS plans and policies
EMS Responders:
•Police, Fire
•FR, EMT, EMT-P
Administrative Governance/Legal
Equipment/Technology
Communication
Service/Follow-up

Structure (Parts)
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Control risks/hazards/threats

Function
(What)

Figure 5d. Definitive Care in Medical Center
Purpose (Why)
Return of community
to state of wellness

Open System:
Ensure medical center response
and control, patient support, and
control of threats/risks/hazards

Process
(How)

Direct Response/Feedback:
• Assess/Protect
• CPR/Defibrillation
• ALS
• Advanced diagnosis, testing,
survey, therapeutic and drug
intervention
Use equipment/technology
Personnel Management
Medical/Psychological/Ethical
decision making

3

Recognizes and responds to EMS
transport/arrival:
Follow medical plans and policies
Control risks/hazards/threats

Medical and Allied Responders:
• Nurses, Physicians, Allied and
Technical Medical Staff
Administrative Governance/Legal
Equipment/Technology
Communication
Service/Follow-up

Structure (Parts)
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Function
(What)

III. Reframing Survival and SCA
Thinking about SCA survival in a systemic framework offers a number of
important recommendations. The following are some of the many examples that rather
than optimizing any one part considers how to enhance the relationship between parts in
order to ensure the integrity of the entire system.

Functional Considerations
When considering the overall function of the system, the design of plans to
manage SCA should integrate the interests, obligations and needs of the entire system.
Therefore, plans should have attributes and values agreed upon and understood by all and
rather than three plans, each designed for others to understand and follow, there should be
one plan that integrates everyone but with sections that apply to each subsystem. The
plan should identify appropriate categories such as risks and hazards; stakeholders with
relevant interests and competencies; required medical, legal, ethical and social policies
and expectations; educational and technological resources; and the nature of how to
ensure effective communication among all involved.
Since a single plan must account for all stakeholders, the following groups should
be included in its design: management from the organization preparing for SCA, and
representatives or designated responders from that organization; EMS administration that
controls who will be sent to local organizations and all EMS responders who may be on
duty when “911” requires a response; and management and responders in the medical
center who are likely to interact with the patient and/or representatives from the patient’s
workplace, EMS responders and administration. If local organizations do not integrate
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with EMS the planning of how SCA will be managed when EMS arrive at their facility,
or if they do not determine the nature of how the local emergency department integrates
with EMS and their own workplace, the likelihood of smooth interface and
communication are reduced. These and other aspects of coordinated planning are
essential when SCA occurs.

Structural Considerations
The structural aspects of managing SCA concern integrating the parts identified
in the written plan. Structural parts include people (and groups), information (including
policies, regulations and documentation), products (including technology) and services
(including follow-up replacement). To ensure structural integration involves determining
what the parts share, as well as what conflicts and absences exist among the subsystems.
Since the written plan should address organizational stakeholders, policies, and
procedures, one important structural part is the nature of the governance structure, i.e.,
specifying who is in charge when subsystems come together. Integrating the structure of
governance across the groups may be important if a workplace has personnel who are as
qualified or more qualified than those from EMS, or if treatment is being directed by a
qualified health care practitioner when EMS expects to “take charge.” Governance
should not be decided on the scene; it should be thought about carefully in advance,
included in the system planning, and carried out as agreed by all involved.
Clearly specifying the technology or equipment that will be available for use
during SCA is also a topic that should be integrated. If a workplace has lifesaving
equipment that is likely to be used with a patient until EMS arrives or there are
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communication devices that could be helpful, this information should be known by EMS
to ensure that they understand what resources are likely and so equipment can be matched
or integrated, if needed. If there are special patient needs (patient history) or unique
workplace threats/hazards (construction or other access barriers) these should be
understood by EMS and the medical center which will receive the patient. Because
communication among the subsystems should be integrated, technology should be
available to ensure all participants have equal access and effectiveness.

Process Considerations
Process concerns how the plans will be carried out using the designated
structural parts. If the overall plan identified the need to provide resuscitation when
SCA is recognized, one important item of equipment would be an automated external
defibrillator (AED). A related structural part would be the resources to ensure that
personnel were educated (and up-to-date) in how to perform CPR and use an AED. The
process would concern – as an example – how to communicate that a person had
collapsed and that EMS was needed; how to get the AED to the site of the emergency so
trained people could use it; how other equipment (also brought to the scene) would be
integrated with it; how information about its use would be communicated to others, if
needed; how personnel would work cooperatively during resuscitation; and how the AED
would be serviced after its use. Process requirements similar to these should be
understood by all before EMS arrives, while EMS transitions then takes responsibility for
the patient, and when EMS transitions with the medical center.
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Since process among the subsystems should be integrated, it suggests that
common rather than unique equipment and technology would be preferred. It may be
possible, for example, to redesign the communication process so that a telephone call
made to “911” would not only provide a request to send EMS responders, but would also
open a communication channel with EMS and the hospital emergency department. This
would make it possible for all subsystems to engage in information exchange while the
first responders attended to the SCA victim (and thereby received support or advice)
while waiting for the arrival of EMS. When EMS was in route to the patient, while at the
scene then during their transport to the medical center, all groups would have continuous
information access and update. A telephone line that made the connection as soon as the
AED turned on would enable this.

Purpose Considerations
The purpose of the system addresses why the functions, structures, and
processes are needed. Within each subsystem the answer is similar: to increase the
probability of survival following SCA and to protect the health and safety of the people
engaged in response efforts, and the organizational structures of which all are a part. As
survival from SCA is influenced by the integration of all subsystems, not the activities of
one part, the value of working together should be understood and agreed upon.
When a person collapses due to SCA, I argue that “who will live and who will
die” - is not determined by merely engaging in early access, early CPR, early AED and
early ALS. Many more interrelated forces influence survival. Broadly, these involve the
nature and expectations about people and their work within organizations, and how those
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involved in planning and responding think about reality and information. More
specifically, survival involves the details of how preparation and response plans are
designed, what components are specified, how the activities are carried out, and why
those involved agree to participate. These translate into the degree of perceived threat,
quality of planning, governance, structure, culture, education and resources allocated.
I argue that the Chain of Survival metaphor, in terms of organizational
components and in its conception, is not a “system” because it does not address the
degree to which organizations, EMS and community medical personnel are integrated.
This is not a Workplace or EMS or Medical Center problem. Rather, it is the
responsibility of every organization in the community system of which all are parts to
accomplish this integration. Less important and of less value for patient survival are
efforts that focus on any one part, as if the solution to the patient survival problem could
be found by optimizing any one level. More important for patient survival is to
understand and bring together the organizational system parts, all of which have purposes
and interests, then align and interrelate the parts within the whole.

_________________
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